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Introduction 
This paper is aimed at providing a framework for the analysis of organizational 
structures and processes in the global management consulting industry. Our basic 
question is why do global consulting firms exist? What distinctive advantages (if any) 
are they able to bring to their clients and the consulting task which cannot be achieved 
by ‘national’ firms? Consideration of this question leads us into alternative modes of 
internationalisation in this sector. Economists in the field of international business 
have long posed this question in relation to manufacturing firms (e.g. Dunning 1993). 
However, their answers tend to be limited to economic considerations and ignore the 
ways in which issues of organizational structure, power and processes impact on the 
internationalising strategies of firms. More recently other authors have posed the same 
question specifically in relation to professional services firms (Aharonhi 2000: 
Lowendahl 2000; Nachum 2000; Roberts 1998; 1999; 2004). These authors have 
argued that there are specific characteristics of professional services that require an 
adaptation of the dominant models of internationalisation. These relate to the 
distinctive interface between clients and suppliers in these contexts where co-presence 
and interaction is typically essential. This interaction in conditions where knowledge 
is ambiguous and/or clients may be less ‘knowledgeable’ than the professionals about 
the nature and quality of the services delivered has tended also to lead to national 
regulatory regimes controlling how some professional services are delivered, 
monitored and controlled. These factors have tended to militate against the 
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globalization of professional services. However, in recent years, the development of 
professional services outside strong regulatory frameworks of practice (such as in the 
case of management consultancies and advertising agencies), the gradual decline of 
national regulatory regimes under pressures of ‘free trade’ and the increased 
international standardisation of certain forms of professional services (such as audits) 
has opened up more possibilities for the internationalisation of firms in this area. The 
general phenomenon of what Giddens (1990) has labelled ‘time-space distanciation’ 
in theory makes it easier to both maintain communication and control across widely 
spread national contexts and also to facilitate forms of cross-national team-building 
and cooperation. For all these reasons, the services sector in general and professional 
services in particular has seen a massive expansion of international activity over the 
last two decades. Bryson et al, for example state that ‘the value of world commercial 
services exports has increased some 3.5 times between 1980 and 1999’ (Bryson et al. 
2004: 217). The 2004 World Investment Report from UNCTAD noted that ‘on 
average, services accounted for two-thirds of total FDI inflows during 2001-2, valued 
at some $500 billion’ (UNCTAD 2004: xx). Interestingly, the report went on to state 
that ‘as the transnationalization of the services sector in home and host countries lags 
behind that of manufacturing, there is scope for a further shift towards services’ 
(ibid.). This suggests that the organizational issues concerned with the 
internationalization of service firms have not disappeared. It is these organizational 
issues which lie at the heart of our concerns. 
 
In order to assess these organizational issues, we refer to the emerging literature 
which goes beyond the issue of the economic advantages of internationalisation to 
MNCs towards considering how organizations can manage the complex inter-
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relationships between the different parts of multinationals (Morgan et al. 2001; 
Geppert et al. 2003; Kristensen and Zeitlin 2005; Whitley 2005). What organizational 
forms enable multinationals to achieve these proposed advantages and what are the 
limitations to this process? Most of this discussion has taken place in the context of 
manufacturing industry (c.f. Morgan and Quack 2005) and part of our objective is to 
show how a similar analysis can be made relevant particularly for management 
consultancy firms.  
 
The paper consists of the following sections. Firstly, we begin by discussing the 
general issue of why do global firms per se exist? This literature is predominantly 
driven by an understanding of manufacturing firms rather than services. This is useful 
in that it begins to make clear both what the main problems are with regard to the 
organization and coordination of global firms and how these might relate to other 
organizational forms. The second part of the paper examines these debates in relation 
to professional services firms with a particular focus on the types of 
internationalisation available to services companies and the factors which influence 
particular strategies. This section explores in particular the specific characteristics of 
professional services and the way in which this impacts on internationalisation. As 
with manufacturing, professional services can, in theory, be delivered across national 
borders in a variety of ways ranging from exports through to the establishment of 
affiliates in other countries. However, most analysts recognise that services, 
particularly those professional services such as management consultancy with which 
this chapter is concerned, require a level of face-to-face interaction with clients that is 
not the case in manufacturing. The importance in professional services of what is 
often referred to as the simultaneity of production and consumption which leads to the 
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non-tradability (across borders) of many services therefore tends to militate against 
export strategies and in principle to favour the establishment of subsidiaries or 
affiliates in particular localities. This is, of course, complicated by many other factors, 
such as national regulations, cultural differences and established client relationships 
which have in the past acted as barriers to the establishment of subsidiary affiliates. 
However, in the last two decades, an increasing number of professional service 
sectors (including management consultancy) have seen the emergence of ‘global 
firms’ with strategies based on the expansion of local affiliates in multiple 
jurisdictions. We examine some of the issues which arise from this expansion. In the 
third section, we focus more specifically on the management consultancy industry. 
This industry contains a number of ‘global’ companies with affiliates in many 
different countries. What we are particularly interested in is the way in which they 
work organizationally and how their structure as a global firm is reflected in their 
practices. We present a broadly sceptical account of the globalization of their 
practices. We argue that there is a disjuncture between the ‘global’ image and the 
‘local’ reality. This in turn raises two important areas of debate. Firstly why does this 
disjuncture exist and how is it reproduced? Secondly what does this mean for the 
market for management consultancy services in any particular country?  
 
Taking a range of indicators, we argue that there are substantial organizational 
barriers to achieving the economies of scale, scope and learning predicted by 
economic accounts of these firms. We argue that there are high costs entailed in 
sustaining the global firm model in consultancy whilst the benefits are uncertain. The 
reason they are sustained, therefore, is more to do with the effect of reputational and 
legitimacy considerations and these firms’ abilities to convince their clients and others 
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of their efficacy. In particular, the ambiguity and uncertainty of managerial action in 
general and of the impact of management consultants on firms leads to proxy 
indicators of their effectiveness (Clark, 1995). These proxy indicators frequently 
include the characteristics of the firms themselves in relation to factors such as size 
and global reach, the elite status of recruits and the influential networks into which 
global consultancies are connected. Thus the global consulting firm with high 
reputation and high legitimacy to other global actors (most obviously institutional 
investors and shareholders) becomes a preferred partner in a variety of contexts 
because its ‘potency’ rubs off on its client, whatever happens at the level of any 
particular consultancy project. Similarly, the client’s status and reputation can work 
back on reinforcing that of the consultancy (e.g. with ‘blue chip’ clients). However, 
because of the costs of such services (related, inter alia, to the high costs of 
coordination in such firms) and the nature of many of them, these firms by no means 
sweep the board. Their services are basically directed to a particular group of large 
international firms1 and large scale projects such as outsourcing. This implies that 
beneath this level, there will be opportunities for many other forms of management 
consulting organization, not just in local settings but also across national borders. 
Here the specificity of national institutional contexts as an influence on the demand 
for management consultancy services remains especially strong. We therefore need to 
be cautious about analysing the management consultancy industry purely from the 
point of view of the large global firms. The survival and development of small firms 
locally, nationally and internationally modifies this picture substantially. 
 
 
                                                 
1 We should also note here the increasingly important role these global consultancies play in advising 
governments, transnational bodies and large scale voluntary international organizations on a range of 
issues. 
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Global firms: the lessons from manufacturing 
The internationalisation of manufacturing firms has been intensively studied. This 
reflects the economic and social context of the period from the 1950s through to the 
1980s when it was the export of manufactured goods and the growth of foreign direct 
investment to fund production facilities overseas that characterised the increasing 
internationalisation of the world economy. In this process, the ‘multinational firm’ 
became increasingly prominent as the organizational form which was central to 
internationalisation. Dunning’s ‘eclectic theory’ of the multinational explained its 
emergence in terms of the interaction between ownership advantages, location 
advantages and internalization advantages (Dunning 1993). Thus firms which had 
developed effective and efficient forms of production in their home context would 
seek to leverage their existing economies of scale and scope (ownership advantages) 
by expanding into new locations. Locations would be chosen according to their own 
advantages such as enabling the firm to avoid tariff barriers, be close to markets and 
consumers, reduce costs (of transport, raw materials and in some cases, labour) and 
enable access to new sources of capital and knowledge (location advantages). Such 
decisions would also be influenced by the costs and benefits of internalisation of this 
process, as opposed to following alternative strategies such as export, licensing and 
franchising (internalisation advantages).  
 
During the late 1980s and 1990s, these arguments became more complex as theories 
of the multinational shifted away from the heavily centralised view which 
characterised earlier discussions towards views of the MNC as a ‘heterarchy’ 
(Hedlund 1986; 1993; 1999) or ‘differentiated network’ (Nohria and Ghoshal 1997). 
In this view, the efficiency of the MNC derived not just from its ability to leverage 
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economies of scale and scope but also from its access to multiple sites of expertise 
and learning which increased its capacity for innovation. In Bartlett and Ghoshal’s 
model (1989) of the ‘transnational firm’, flows of information and knowledge across 
different sites within the MNC via various forms of information gathering, 
organizational structuring and project team work gave the MNC distinctive new 
capacities for innovation that could not be matched inside nationally based firms. 
Thus in organizational terms, the problem was how to develop a structure, strategy 
and management system that would enable the successful achievement of this process 
of learning and the emergence of the ‘transnational firm’. Bartlett and Ghoshal 
emphasize that this is not an issue of structure. The transnational cannot be reduced to 
a structural model along the lines of a matrix where the tensions between the three 
core objectives are mediated through formal reporting relationships. Responsibilities 
for decisions in the transnational will tend to gravitate to the most appropriate level in 
the organization. They state that transnationals ‘decide task by task and even decision 
by decision where issues should be managed. Some decisions will tend to be made on 
a global basis, often at the corporate centre…; others will be the appropriate 
responsibility of local management. But for some issues, multiple perspectives are 
important and shared responsibility is necessary’ (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989: 209). In 
many ways it is the task of the headquarters to balance between different focuses and 
change these frequently. A hierarchical structure cannot be imposed on this diversity 
which is more like a ‘differentiated and interdependent network….integrated with a 
flexible coordinating mechanism’ (ibid: 210). In Hedlund’s terminology, the firm 
moves from hierarchy to heterarchy. 
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This model in turn has raised three interesting debates which we will return to through 
the rest of this chapter (for an overview of these debates see Morgan 2005). The first 
which we label ‘the subsidiary autonomy’ debate concerns the nature of subsidiaries 
and the knowledge and skills embedded in subsidiaries. In the earlier model of the 
MNC, subsidiaries were generally presented as ‘passive’; they were recipients of the 
knowledge and skills transferred from the home base. In the emerging model, 
however, subsidiaries are perceived as ‘active’ with their own socially embedded 
skills and knowledge (Birkinshaw, 1997; 2000; 2001). More recent analysis has 
linked this in particular to institutional arguments in which subsidiaries may have 
their own distinctive sets of competences and capabilities which arise from their 
particular local institutional context, e.g. in terms of the skill profile of their 
employees or the nature of the cooperation between employees and managers which 
exists in a particular context with consequent effects on product innovation and 
process improvement (Belanger et al. 1999; Kristensen and Zeitlin 2005). From this 
perspective local sites are arenas of negotiation and adaptation between locally 
embedded actors and procedures, practices, technologies and personnel drawn from 
head office. Within the MNC, local sites range in the degree of autonomy and control 
which they construct for themselves in the internal processes of the wider firm. Some 
subsidiaries become active players in the construction of the firm, its boundaries, its 
strategies and structures whilst others are more passive.  
 
The second debate concerns how these subsidiaries develop their distinctive capacities 
and capabilities and how these are coordinated across the multinational – we label this 
the MNC governance debate. As subsidiaries are (to varying degrees) connected into 
local networks of firms and institutions, it is the capacities of this local context that 
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provide the distinctive capabilities of the subsidiary within the MNC. Solvell and 
Zander (1998) refer to how subsidiaries tend over time to deepen their attachment to 
the local context and loosen their connection to the MNC as a whole (see also Solvell 
2003). Kristensen and Zeitlin (2005) identify similar aspects in their study of a 
particular MNC. This demonstrates that the local subsidiaries of the MNC have their 
own distinctive characteristics in terms of relations between managers, employees and 
surrounding networks of firms and local government institutions. These distinctive 
characteristics influence their abilities to participate in the competitive internal 
market. Their study raises the issue of how head office managers are able to reap the 
benefits of this by, on the one hand, sustaining local innovative networks and on the 
other hand developing mechanisms which transfer some of the skills and knowledges 
around the MNC itself. How is it possible to move this knowledge around effectively? 
How is it possible to sustain local networks whilst ensuring that there are economies 
of scale, e.g. from global supply management? Kristensen and Zeitlin argue that the 
current form of governance in most multinationals militates against this form of 
cooperation, instead setting sites against each other in a zero sum game. Therefore a 
central question for the MNC, in common with large firms generally, is how to 
manage and govern relations between the various constituent parts. 
 
The third debate touches on this by bringing back in the issue of coordination costs. 
Can global firms do this better than markets or, more likely, inter-firm networks of 
various types? We label this the ‘coordination costs’ debate. A number of recent 
authors have pointed to the decline of the large integrated ‘Chandlerian’ firm. 
Langlois, for example, has argued that ‘rather than seeing the continued dominance of 
multi-unit firms in which managerial control spans a large number of vertical stages, 
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we are seeing a dramatic increase in vertical specialization….In this respect, the 
visible hand – understood as managerial coordination of multiple stages of production 
within a corporate framework – is fading into a ghostly translucence’ (Langlois  2003: 
352; see also Lamoreaux et al 2002; Sturgeon 2002). Langlois describes what he 
terms the emergence of ‘a richer mix of organizational forms’ in the ‘new economy’ 
arising from vertical disintegration and specialization. These forms relate to modes of 
coordination between different types of firms. One broad label for this whole process 
is, of course, Castell’s ‘network society’ (1996) and this does indeed reflect Langlois’ 
earlier interests in the relationship between markets, hierarchies and networks 
(Langlois and Robertson 1995). In the network model, firms specialise in particular 
positions in the value chain. So long as firms at different points can create 
mechanisms which allow cooperation and communication across boundaries, the 
network model reduces coordination and transaction costs whilst enhancing 
innovative capacities. More generally, higher levels of flexibility can be achieved 
through firms linking to others as and when needed rather than incorporating a wide 
range of skills inside the firm itself. The same argument can be applied to MNCs. In 
Kristensen and Zeitlin’s analysis, the economic value added by the head office is 
problematic. The internal conflicts which are set in train by the competition for 
investment and mandates generates high amounts of effort and cost that may be 
economically unviable in the long run as the only way to control them is to increase 
standardisation and this in effect undermines the raison d’etre of the MNC as it 
destroys local variety and diversity, thus weakening the capacity for innovation.  
 
These arguments point to the need to be critical and analytical about the emergence of 
global firms. As such firms try to access all the advantages which Dunning describes, 
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their managerial problems increase because the maintenance of hierarchical control is 
difficult and counter-productive, whilst the development of heterarchical controls 
makes the whole system more difficult to govern in a consistent and coherent manner. 
It is not at all clear how these problems of governance can be resolved in ways that do 
not simultaneously undermine what are perceived as the main advantages of the 
MNC. This suggests the importance of firstly being sceptical of the claims which are 
made for the economic efficiency of the MNC and secondly being open to the 
emergence of different forms of coordination across national boundaries. Such a 
perspective has not yet been applied to the internationalisation of the service sector. In 
the next section, we consider the dominant interpretations of internationalisation 
amongst service firms before going on to provide our own account building on this 
distinctive view of multinationals. 
 
Internationalisation and the Service Sector 
Recent decades have seen an increased interest in the internationalisation of the 
service sector. The recent UNCTAD World Investment Report 2004 was entitled ‘The 
shift towards services’. The report indicates that 60% of the world’s FDI stock was in 
this sector in 2002 (up from 25% in the early 1970s). Measuring internationalisation 
more broadly than simply through FDI in the service sector has been problematic. The 
UN as part of its attempt to measure this phenomenon has recently classified services 
trade into the following categories: 
“Mode 1, cross border supply occurs when suppliers of services in one country supply 
services to consumers in another country without either supplier or consumer moving 
into the territory of the other. 
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Mode 2, consumption abroad refers to the process by which a consumer resident in 
one country moves to another country to obtain a service. 
Mode 3, commercial presence occurs when enterprises in an economy may supply 
services internationally through the activities of their foreign affiliates 
Mode 4, presence of natural persons describes the process by which an individual 
moves to the country of the consumer in order to provide a service, whether on his or 
her own behalf or on behalf of his or her employer.” (UN 2002 Manual on Statistics 
on International Trade in Services quoted in Bryson et al. 2004: 200) 
Generally the main interest in the internationalisation of services refers to mode 3, the 
expansion of what we refer to as ‘global firms’ in professional services. By global 
firms, we mean firms that have significant affiliates or branch offices outside their 
home state2. In the professional services environment, the establishment of these 
global firms has occurred at different rates in different sectors. Thus by the 1990s, the 
firms which now make up the Big Four3 global accountancy firms had offices in most 
countries in the world. In the law sector, however, globalisation processes have been 
much slower and even now what are termed global law firms tend to have a small 
number of offices located in around 10 key centres (or ‘global cities’ in Sassen’s term 
Sassen 2001: Taylor 2004) rather than being spread across the globe. Furthermore, it 
is only in the last few years that mergers of law firms across distinctive national 
systems have occurred as opposed to the opening up of new branch offices 
(Beaverstock et al. 1999; 2000; Beaverstock 2004; Morgan and Quack 2004; Spar 
1997; Warf 1997). Even then merger processes are slow and constrained occurring 
                                                 
2 In this context, we are not so concerned with the degree of globalization per se or with whether these 
firms are best described as ‘regional multinationals’ rather than global firms (see Morgan and Quack 
2004 for a more nuanced discussion of this in relation to law firms). 
3 By the time of the collapse of Andersens, the big accountancy firms were four in number reducing 
from the Big Six in the early 1990s and the Big Five in the late 1990s. 
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mostly across a small number of jurisdictions (e.g. the US and the UK, the US/UK 
and Germany).  
 
Dunning (1993) identifies a range of factors within his eclectic OLI model that 
particularly influence this process in service firms. Under the category of ownership 
advantages, he notes the importance of quality consistency, reputation and product 
differentiation to keeping and winning clients in overseas location. In terms of 
location, the two crucial issues are whether the service is tradable and whether the 
regulatory framework is open. If the service is non-tradable across borders and 
requires co-presence, then the service firm has to locate in order to win business, even 
where it has an existing long-standing relationship with the client but in different 
national contexts. However, this requires that there are no regulatory barriers to 
foreign presence, which was not the case in many professional services until recently. 
Finally where the service requires customization and interaction with the client, it 
cannot really be delivered by franchise or licensing. The firm has to retain the skills 
in-house and to deliver them to clients itself. Under these circumstances, Dunning 
predicts the emergence of international professional service firms.  
 
Other authors have linked ownership and internalization advantages to the issues of 
knowledge and learning in two ways, firstly that of leverage and secondly that of 
innovation. Leverage implies that resources established in one context can be re-used 
in other contexts. The degree to which professional services fit this is variable 
depending on the types of business. For example, at first sight, a law firm in London 
has no obvious resources which would enable it to compete effectively in Shanghai. 
However, things are rarely as simple as much commercial business between 
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multinationals in Shanghai and the law associated with it is likely to be based on 
English law. Therefore the more accurate analysis would be that the UK law firm has 
no advantages to bring to a situation where it is competing for local clients but it has 
many where it is working for UK MNCs or other firms that are having to contract 
under English law. Furthermore, once established it may be able to compete for local 
business on the grounds of its international reputation (assuming it has employed local 
lawyers in its office).  
 
The issue of reputation is crucial in this context. As Teece states ‘while reputational 
capital is certainly not unique to professional service firms, it is frequently the most 
important asset. This is because other methods of selling – for instance, advertising- 
are usually quite ineffective” (Teece 2003: 902). Aharoni states that ‘the ability to 
give services globally is part and parcel of a perception of high reputation and an 
indicator of competence and commitment to service the customer. Global firms are 
able to transfer reputation from one geographical market to another. In fact, the major 
advantage of the giant global accounting, consulting or advertising firm is that clients 
believe these firms connote high quality’ (Aharoni 2000: 127-8). Professional service 
firms rely especially on word of mouth recommendations or ‘networked trust’ 
(Gluckler and Armbruster, 2003) where reputation is gained and reinforced by 
connections to and endorsements from other powerful actors within particular 
corporate networks, e.g. around Wall Street and the City of London for law firms, 
around ‘blue-chip’ corporate clients for management consultancies etc.. Therefore 
professional service firms may see internationalisation as an opportunity to leverage 
their existing resources further by building and developing their existing reputation.  
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The first way in which firms achieve this is often by following their clients abroad so 
that their initial contacts and networks can be leveraged further in new markets. This 
activity has been labelled as ‘Client Following’ and it may be accompanied by or lead 
onto Market Seeking strategies, i.e. looking for new clients in overseas markets. An 
alternative or complementary approach is to recruit or ‘poach’ senior consultants from 
other firms with existing client contacts in a particular region (see Pinault, 2001) 
 
A rather more complex but equally important element concerns innovation. It is 
generally argued that innovation in professional service firms is an outcome of 
interaction with clients (rather than from the establishment of the equivalent of R+D 
labs or the linkage with outside ‘incubator’ firms that characterizes some areas such 
as biotechnology and IT) (see e.g. Mills and Morris, 1986; Lowendahl et al. 2001). 
Clients’ problems generally have elements of novelty as well as routine. Professional 
service firms therefore tend to balance off the advantages of standardisation with 
those of the customisation of solutions depending on the sector of professional 
services in which they are working, their strategic positioning and their structural 
configuration. Extreme or, rather, explicit standardisation runs the risk firstly of a loss 
to reputation as clients feel ‘cheated’ and secondly that opportunities to identify new 
products and processes which can be sold on to other clients are missed. Professional 
service firms are likely, therefore, to look for ways in which new opportunities can be 
identified. Internationalisation in particular has the potential, as Bartlett and Ghoshal 
described in relation to manufacturing firms, to open up new innovative ways of 
doing things by diversifying the nature of the clients and the problems with which the 
firm deals. As Lowendahl states ‘in PSFs, the competitive advantage, if achieved, 
results from the ability of the firm to continuously tap into the knowledge developed 
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in all relevant centres of the world, regardless of the local market potential in these 
knowledge centres’ (Lowendahl 2000: 152). 
 
These firm level drivers towards internationalisation have gradually got stronger as 
the broader environment has changed. Key elements here have been the emergence of 
forms of international standardization embedded in discourses of globalization. These 
revolve around arguments about the increasing integration of financial markets, the 
development of common global standards of business knowledge and techniques 
propounded in the media, business schools and management consultancies, and the 
emergence of formal and informal modes of international regulation (Morgan 2001a; 
2001b; Thrift 1998).  These discourses of globalization exert a powerful influence on 
many actors, providing for them both an understanding of the contemporary social 
and economic environment and also a way of acting in that environment. Large global 
professional services firms and their clients are key participants both in constructing 
this discourse and enacting it as a social reality in the face of potential national 
resistance (e.g. through spreading particular conceptions of law, e.g. Dezelay and 
Garth 1996; 2002a; 2002b; international standards of accounting, e.g. Arnold 2004; 
Botzem and Quack 2006 and particular forms of management knowledge e.g. Sahlin-
Andersson and Engwall 2002). The global presence of professional service firms is 
legitimated by the discourse of open borders and common practices whilst the 
commonality of practices and discourses is reinforced by their actions for clients, both 
in the private sector and inside particular states or cross-national institutions such as 
the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO.  
 
 18
In conclusion, there are a number of drivers towards the internationalisation of 
professional service firms. These can be partially explained in relation to previous 
models of internationalisation but for a variety of reasons, a number of other factors 
come into play. The issue of co-presence and the centrality of client-professional 
interaction is particularly important. This affects how firms internationalise in order to 
leverage their existing resources and build new products and innovations whilst 
maintaining and developing their global reputation. In the following section, we look 
at these issues particularly from the point of view of the management consultancy 
industry.  
 
The Management Consultancy industry and internationalisation  
In this section, we firstly concentrate on global management consultancy firms and 
how they organize themselves as ‘transnationals’. In this respect our concern is with 
understanding the way in which they represent themselves as global and how this is 
seen to relate to their capabilities to serve clients. Secondly we look at this more 
critically and consider more specifically what ‘being global’ means in this context. 
We relate this to the broader problems of multinational organization described earlier 
as ‘the subsidiary autonomy’ debate, the ‘governance’ debate and the ‘coordination 
costs’ debate.    
 
In organizational terms, global management consultancies vary in their strategy and 
structure (Kipping 2002). Two broad categories can be identified though there is some 
overlap between them. What Kipping refers to as the second wave consultancy groups 
(following the first wave originating out of the scientific management movement) are 
the prestigious ‘strategy’ consulting groups such as McKinsey and Boston Consulting 
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Group. These firms became international in the 1950s and 1960s spreading their 
offices particularly into Europe as part of the broader expansion of US management 
ideas into the European environment that occurred at this time (Djelic 1998; 
McKenna et al. 2003). These firms were built on the partnership form of governance 
and have continued to retain this. Although their business interests have spread from 
pure ‘strategy’ research, they tend to remain distinctive in culture and approach from 
the other main grouping which emerged out of the big accounting firms in the 1980s 
(for an example of these differences in action see Empson 2001).    
 
By size and geographical spread, the largest and most global management 
consultancies are those which originated inside accounting firms. In Kipping’s 
terminology these are the third wave of consultancy business. The consultancy 
business of the accounting firms grew particularly on the basis of selling advice in the 
light of knowledge gained about management problems through the auditing process. 
This tended to be concerned with more operational issues than that of the strategy 
consultants, e.g. in terms of business processes and IT integration. More lately, the 
shift towards outsourcing of various functions, particularly associated with IT and 
various forms of payment, invoice and accounting procedures has added a third major 
leg to their business. 
  
In organizational terms, the establishment of these businesses increasingly created 
tensions within the accounting firms. One aspect related to the relations between 
qualified accountants and the management consultants, issues which revolved around 
reward packages, prestige and status and generally power within the firm. Tension 
also emerged partly within the firm but also in the broader regulatory context 
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concerning the impact of the drive for consulting income on the probity of auditing 
activities. In particular, it was increasingly claimed firms were being less objective 
about audits than was expected because they were keen to sell on consultancy services 
to their audit clients and did not wish to lose the potential for this more profitable 
business by being overly critical of the company on these issues (Stevens, 1981). The 
result has been the splitting off of consultancies from the accounting firms. The 
earliest example of this was when Accenture split off from the now deceased Arthur 
Andersen accounting company. More recently and more closely related to impact of 
regulatory scandals such as Enron, there has been increased pressure on the 
accounting firms to sell of their consulting arms. Cap Gemini bought Ernst & 
Young’s consulting arm in 1999 and in 2002 PwC Consulting was bought by IBM. 
KPMG’s accounting arm was given a NASDAQ IPO in 2001 and following the 
acquisition of a number of ex-Andersen businesses changed its name to BearingPoint 
Inc in 2002. Interestingly, the separation of these units from their accounting firms 
meant a shift in governance, from the partnership structure to a shareholder structure 
and quotation on stock markets. Thus the two main areas of global consulting are now 
differentiated more strongly by their governance structure than by their broader 
strategic purposes. 
 
What are the advantages which these global management consultancies bring to their 
tasks? Clearly this partly depends on the nature of the task, e.g. whether it 
predominantly requires work in one location or whether it spreads across national 
boundaries. Either way, however, the global management consultancy will claim 
advantages over local or national firms purely by virtue of its ‘global reach’ and the 
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processes which are necessary to achieve this.  As Backlund and Werr in their study 
of the websites of global consulting firms state; 
 
“All firms underline that they are a global or international consulting firm. The global 
character of these companies is also reflected in their recurring descriptions of being 
‘world leaders’ in their respective businesses. …More or less implicit in these 
references to globality is the view that a global reach contributes to the consultancies’ 
knowledge stock” (Backlund and Werr 2004). 
 
The companies construct their global identity as key to their ability to serve their 
clients in a number of ways. 
 
Firstly, in addition to general size advantages such as having potentially large 
numbers of staff available to work on large projects and as a back up if resource 
requirements change, there is the issue of experience and the global management 
consultancy firm’s claim to have the experience of managing complex cross-national 
projects. It will claim benefit from what has been termed the ‘economics of 
repetition’, i.e. the existence of tried and tested processes inside the firm which enable 
it to pull together cross-national teams as a matter of routine. Secondly, the global 
firm will claim benefit from the stored expertise and knowledge of its consultants 
across the world who may have faced similar problems. Such firms have various 
techniques for capturing this knowledge ranging from ‘knowledge management 
databases’ which store cases and examples through to the identification of particular 
individuals as experts or centres of excellence (see below and Roberts, 2004) in the 
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problem area, part of whose job is to resource the organization more generally with 
this knowledge as and when required (Rudolph and Okech 2003).  
 
Overall the global management consultancy can claim to be advantaged by economies 
of scale (it has a greater source of specialised knowledge than comparable national 
firms), economies of scope (it has experience of a greater range of connected 
problems and solutions that can be leveraged by consultants to extend and develop the 
scope of activities), economies of repetition (it has an established set of routines that 
can be set into motion as and when projects are first mooted) and economies of 
learning (it has routines for capturing, managing and storing knowledge that can be 
used again). 
 
On top of this the global management consultancy has the crucial advantage of 
reputation. In an area like consulting where there is no standardised knowledge base, 
reputation can be built through association and global consulting firms tend to be 
highly involved in this on a number of levels. One level concerns the process of 
recruitment itself. Global consultancy firms target the top business schools in the US 
for their junior recruits or subsequently send them to such schools. Armbruster, for 
example, states; 
 
“The highly selective recruitment of outstanding individuals provided the consulting 
industry with a considerable touch of intellectual elitism….(and) is still considered a 
way of propagating the notion of an intellectual elite to the business 
environment…(Because) the quality of consulting services is difficult to 
determine…management consultancies need to signal the quality of their services by 
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substitutive means, among which is a highly selective hiring process.” (Armbruster 
2004: 1259). 
 
Global management consultancies are keen to have long lists of applicants to enhance 
the elitism of those who are selected. Another way in which this is reinforced is 
through the almost exclusive reliance of the leading management  consultancy firms 
on ‘the case study interview – a job interview in which an abbreviated form of a 
Harvard Business School case study is posed to the candidate’ (Armbruster 2004: 
1250).  
 
“Being a tool that is only used in management consulting, the case study serves as a 
signifier of otherness and analytical skills. Also…the selection procedure is associated 
with Harvard Business School and thus symbolizes special business training and 
competence’ (Armbruster 2004: 1260).  
 
The fact that in most cases the selectors are themselves not trained HR practitioners 
but rather  working consultants in the firm who ‘have only received training in one-
day or half-day courses’ (op.cit.: 1258) reinforces the sense of an elite self-contained 
group. Alvesson and Karreman argue that this sort of recruitment policy and 
procedure contributes to ‘producing a fairly homogeneous work force’ (2004b: 431). 
In addition, strong cultural control in terms of selection, induction and training in 
corporate methods of analysis reinforces this effect (Roberts, 2004). This is even 
evident in cases where firms recruit from outside the firm, at more senior levels for 
example, where cultural fit is seen as important (Pinault, 2001)  
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The management of reputation through recruitment and selection can be reinforced by 
formal links with business schools, such as supporting research or endowing chairs or 
sponsoring their staff onto MBA degrees. Management consultancies can also act 
‘like’ universities and academics, e.g. by creating their own in-house learning 
institutes which draw in academics from universities or by encouraging their 
employers to present conference papers or publish in academic journals. They can 
also create their own publicly available journal along academic lines, e.g. McKinsey 
Quarterly. Consultancies can also draw reputation from the secondments which they 
support, e.g. into national or international governmental agencies as well as from the 
jobs which their consultants go on to after they leave the firm. In cases such as 
McKinsey, there are active efforts to sustain the McKinsey networks and publicise the 
connections that the firm has to important people and institutions. Reputation is also 
built through having the right sorts of firms as clients and having access to the right 
sorts of people within such firms and even recruiting from them or other consultancies 
with such client links.  
 
Given all these advantages, how do these processes work out in practice? We look at 
this mainly from the point of view of how aspirations to share knowledge relate to 
other organizational processes in the firm. A useful case study which illuminates 
some key issues has been produced by Fenton and Pettigrew in their analysis of how 
Coopers and Lybrand (Europe)4 sought to develop their expertise in the area of 
pharmaceuticals by creating a cross-European network of expertise consisting of 
around 200 consultants. They state that ‘in 1996 the pharma network was formally 
established as a business development group. It was required to develop an integrated 
                                                 
4 Their study is based in the mid 1990s before Price Waterhouse and Coopers and Lybrand merged to 
form PWC and the Big Six became the Big Five. 
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business plan across Europe’. In practice, however, a number of substantial barriers 
emerged to this network becoming an effective force within the firm.  The first and 
most significant point was that the main power base in the firm was at the national 
level. This was strongly associated with the fact that the firm was in effect a 
federation of national partnerships. Individuals were members of particular national 
partnerships and it was at this level that careers and rewards were organized. Partners 
themselves, for example, were rewarded on the basis of the earnings which their 
national partnership achieved. Consulting projects were constructed at the national 
level even where they were with multinational firms. In all client engagements, there 
would be a lead partner and it would be the lead partner who would determine the 
membership of the team working on the project and how the division of labour was to 
be constructed. The purpose of the pharma network was to ensure that teams in this 
area were built from the best consultants no matter what their location. However, 
according to Fenton and Pettigrew, ‘there was a strong perception that national firm 
requirements often took precedence over opportunities in the marketplace…the 
feeling was that they were still operating as a national organization rather than a 
European network’ (Fenton and Pettigrew 2000: 100). Much of this was related to the 
fact that the ultimate profit centres and power centres in the firm were the national 
partnerships and within this, there were certain partnerships which were central and 
others which felt peripheral. For individuals it was most important to contribute to the 
profitability of the national firm and in this way earn high evaluations and promotion. 
For some firms, the pharma network was peripheral and their consultants were 
unlikely to become involved. For other firms, where senior partners were enthusiastic 
backers of the pharma network, consultants needed to be involved. In all these cases, 
the degree of knowledge sharing was contingent on other factors more deeply 
 26
embedded at the national (i.e. organisational structural) level in terms of careers and 
rewards. 
 
This is reinforced by deeper studies of how consultants are monitored and controlled. 
Alvesson and Karreman, for example, in two recent papers, refer to the ‘technocratic’ 
system of control in their management consulting case study (Alvesson and Karreman 
2004a; 2004b). A number of their points reinforce our argument about the importance 
of local/national contexts. Firstly, they state that selection on to projects requires that 
juniors ‘have good relationships with what they perceive as good project managers so 
that the latter will choose/offer them for projects that are attractive to work in’ 
(Alvesson and Karreman 2004b: 432). Secondly, employees are evaluated on a 
frequent basis by their nearest boss, usually their project manager who grades them on 
performance. Thirdly they are provided with a mentor, usually a partner, who offers 
advice on career advancement. All of these processes are dominated by the local 
office, thus cutting across attempts to achieve cooperation across offices in different 
countries or regions5.  
 
Much of this is associated with the inter-twined issues of careers and project 
budgeting in management consultancies. The evaluation and monitoring is part of a 
broader process of ensuring that new members of the firm see that their elite status on 
recruitment has to be sustained by high levels of commitment to the firm and 
effectiveness in fitting in with and contributing to the success of projects, especially in 
terms of generating repeat business or ‘sell on’. The large consultancies therefore 
famously operate what are known as up or out promotion systems. In Nanda and 
                                                 
5 Similar processes are described in the Harvard case study by Nanda and Morrell on consultants in 
Boston Consulting Group (Nanda and Morrell 2004). 
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Morrell’s study of BCG, they describe the expected timescale to move from associate 
to senior Vice President (the BCG partner level) as 10 years. Thus the anticipated 
period on each of the intermediary rungs of the ladder (consultant, project leader, 
manager) is around 2 to 3 years. An employee failing to be promoted in that time is 
basically counselled to leave the firm and given help in moving to another job, not 
least as they may become future clients. The outcome of this is that roughly one in ten 
of the new entrants is likely to reach partner level whilst the others will leave. For the 
individual this creates enormous pressures to perform, reflected in working long 
hours, a willingness to travel away from home and a general high level of 
commitment to the firm (see Alvesson 2000 for an analysis of the tensions involved in 
this process; also Alvesson 2001). It also creates a strong pressure to focus on 
relationships with particular key individuals who are likely to be based in one 
location, the local office. As one consultant told Nandy and Morrell in discussing 
whether to apply for a prestigious overseas relocation position (known as the 
Ambassador programme in BCG), ‘by relocating for some time, I might be cutting 
myself out of the loop. How will I get back into a favourable position in the staffing 
pool? Will my next promotion be delayed?” (Nanda and Morrell 2004: 10). This 
reflects a broader problem in professional service firms concerning issues of 
relocation. In a context where relationships are crucial – with partners, with clients, 
with managers and consultants – movement out of a known environment to an office 
in another national partnership cuts the individual off from these sources of support 
and makes them vulnerable. For this reason, although these firms are characterised by 
high levels of mobility across national borders for purposes of doing projects with 
multinational firms, there is a general reluctance to make a more long-term move. 
This may be a possibility early in the career or as a carrot for a rather quicker 
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promotion, especially if skills match those required by a prestige client, but at partner 
level it is less likely to be undertaken. 
 
The argument here is not that the formal procedures of the firm discourage working 
on cross-national projects and sharing knowledge. In terms of the appraisals and 
evaluations which employees undergo, it seems clear that emphasis is given to these 
aspects of performance although this varies in practice. The issue is more to do with 
how the broader environment of career affects the individual in terms of (a) the 
willingness to share (where career advancement is in effect a tournament between 
peers) and (b) the amount of time which is available above and beyond project time to 
make this effective, not least given the difficulties of translating tacit into explicit 
knowledge. If lower level employees are involved in a tournament, what are the 
advantages of sharing knowledge particularly where time pressures are so tight? Of 
course, this may be built into an appraisal system but then it becomes difficult to 
disentangle the effects of the measures of sharing from the reality of sharing. Thus if 
sharing is measured, amongst other things, by the number of postings one makes to 
the knowledge management system then the tendency is to post more notices to the 
system whether or not they are useful. Such opportunistic behaviour can in theory be 
corrected by a further level of monitoring – how often is a posting used by others in 
the firm and how do they evaluate it? But all of this introduces new levels of 
complexity, bureaucracy and costs in order to correct what is a central part of the 
system, i.e. the tournament process and the effect it has on commitment and hours of 
work and thus on budgets, margins and profitability.  
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This relates to the second point which is that of project budgeting and accounting for 
time. Alvesson and Karreman (2004b) describe the role of partners primarily in terms 
of selling projects and developing the client agreement. Their rewards (i.e. how many 
units – shares - they are allowed to purchase in the following year) are determined by 
the volumes of business sold and the margin achieved on that business. The issue of 
maximizing the margin and monitoring the budget is the responsibility of the project 
manager and this is done through planning the project in terms of manpower, 
resources and cost. This creates a strong framework within which the consultants’ 
billable hours are strictly accounted for, leaving very little slack. On the contrary, as 
Alvesson and Karreman illustrate, billable hours often underestimate the actual hours 
undertaken by consultants, an issue that exercises the consultants greatly but is swept 
under the carpet by the project manager for the obvious reason that if all hours were 
accounted for, the price of the job would have to increase and the client might go 
elsewhere (Alvesson and Karreman 2004b; 433-436). In effect, partners rely on their 
ability to extract more hours from their juniors than they formally request; juniors 
conform, if reluctantly, because they know their reputation as a good team player (and 
therefore their promotion) is dependent on this. 
 
Dunford links some of these issues to the effectiveness of formal knowledge 
management systems for sharing experiences. He states that the quality of information 
in such systems ‘may be impaired at a very basic stage by consultants failing to feed 
information into  their firm’s system, This may be due to something as fundamental as 
time pressure’ (Dunford 2000: 297) He also points to the way in which performance 
evaluations primarily based on billable hours ‘discouraged consultants from taking 
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time to package and share new insights’ (op.cit.: 298). His overall conclusion is that 
‘a lot of the investment in knowledge management is an act of faith’ (op.cit. 301). 
 
This relates to a broader point about the nature of the global management firms. Their 
basic organizational unit is the national partnership and the local offices within that 
framework. This is where rewards and careers at all levels are ultimately determined. 
It is where business is generated and projects managed. Where national partnerships 
gain most clearly from their membership of a global firm is in reputational terms. In 
practical terms of sharing information, knowledge and practice across boundaries the 
gains are more limited although there is some benefit from drawing on 
(functional/client) specialists, albeit at a distance, by phone, email and video for 
example. Clearly many consultancies share a standard model of work practices and 
they also share a general registry of expertise and knowledge. However, to make this 
more than a limited benefit requires efforts at integration, cooperation and joint 
learning that have one obvious drawback as far as all members of the firm are 
concerned. That drawback is that they generate high overheads. For example, 
establishing an in-house university or an international management development is 
very expensive and involves taking consultants off billable activity. Establishing a 
global network of expertise that can be called upon at any point to advise on projects 
is expensive if it extends beyond a list of names and telephone numbers. Capturing 
more of the firm’s revenue to support activities which are not directly revenue 
creating goes against the grain of these highly focused, budget driven organizations as 
well as against the interests of most of the individuals inside them. Thus firms can 
espouse the rhetoric of global knowledge management systems and global integration 
of teams and knowledge, but in reality they find it very difficult to deliver this except 
 31
insofar as their services are standardised. The firms with the highest margins on 
business (i.e. the strategy firms) are likely to be better able to move in this direction 
than the mass consultancy firms which tend to focus on lower margin projects. 
However, contrary to their projected image, even the strategy houses offer 
standardised forms of analysis so whatever the type of the firm, the problems are 
large. As Fenton and Pettigrew state ‘our probing within the Professional service 
organizations revealed a discernible system-wide imbalance in the degree of 
integration within their networks because of a variety of confounding factors’ (Fenton 
and Pettigrew 2003: 230). These confounding factors include contextual issues 
(differences across national markets, skill differences between partners), historical 
factors (concerned with how different national groups saw the historical inequalities 
between partnerships) and social factors. On social factors they state; 
 
“None of the PSOs had developed effective sanctions beyond peer group pressure; 
similarly there was little in the way of reward and recognition systems in place to 
encourage positive behaviour in the changed firms.” (Fenton and Pettigrew 2003: 
232). 
 In addition, it is important to note the role of clients in shaping consulting practices, 
especially the more sophisticated, innovative or active ones who may well resist the 
offer of a standard consulting approach (Sturdy, 1997). 
 
In conclusion, then, our argument is that just as with global multinational firms in the 
manufacturing area there are good reasons for believing that there are inherent 
limitations to the growth of global firms in management consultancy. To return to our 
three debates in MNCs on subsidiary autonomy, governance of the global entity and 
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coordination costs, we conclude as follows.  Firstly, ‘subsidiaries’ tend to have high 
levels of autonomy. Indeed, up until recently the global management consultancies 
were run as federations of national partnerships6. It is at the national level that 
business is won and the main rewards are distributed. ‘Global’ controls on the 
national context vary in terms of their intensity and effectiveness. Standard 
methodologies in particular areas and shared databases of expertise may be one useful 
element but most crucial at the global level is the reputational element. Local offices 
need to sustain this reputation and although this creates some constraints, there are 
many areas of freedom that remain. Thus we conclude that global management 
consultancies have relatively high levels of subsidiary autonomy, e.g. to develop new 
business areas, new techniques etc.7 In terms of governance, our general conclusion is 
that ‘global governance’ in such firms is weak and as a result there may frequently 
arise tensions between different national practices in terms of how far ‘peripheral’ 
practices become involved in the large projects won in the big consulting markets. 
The issue of how far work is contracted out from a lead partner in one country to 
consultants in other countries is unclear. Barrett et al.’s (2005) recent analysis of how 
international audits are coordinated across different national practices within the same 
global firm reveals that this can involve complex political and economic bargaining 
between more or less powerful national partnerships (for similar arguments see also 
Rose and Hinings 1999 which looks at Global Business Advisory firms which they 
label GBAFs, i.e. accounting firms with consultancy arms). Overall, therefore, the 
potential for political action within the global structure of the firm seems high, though 
this may be mitigated by two factors. Firstly in most of the global consultancies, the 
US partnership is dominant by virtue of the strength of the US consulting markets and 
                                                 
6 It will be interesting to see how the shift to plc status for those companies spun off from the 
accounting firms may impact on these issues in the future. 
7 For similar arguments developed from a rather different perspective see Jones 2002; 2003) 
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the central role of the US partnership in sustaining reputation and cultural control. 
Secondly, the relatively limited resources placed at the global level means that there is 
not so much worth fighting for as there is in manufacturing firms where the global 
headquarters effectively controls the surplus as well as access to investment funds 
through the capital markets8. Finally, the issue of coordination costs across national 
boundaries impacts on two levels. Firstly, it is a considerable problem at the level of 
projects and creating integrated learning. The tight budgetary control exercised on 
activities through the billable hours system militates against expenditure on cross-
national coordination. Secondly, the structure of national partnership control means 
that the global level is relatively weak and dependent for resources. It can therefore 
only achieve limited objectives in terms of ‘global activities’. Thus coordination costs 
are kept relatively low in these systems but the result is that the global integration 
which is proclaimed as an essential part of their competitive advantage is not actually 
achieved. 
 
Discussion and conclusion  
Our analysis of the global management consultancy firm suggests that there are 
organizational problems which mean that it is does not deliver on the ‘transnational 
solution’ as described by Bartlett and Ghoshal. Where it delivers is in terms of 
reputation and as Aharoni (2000) and others have pointed out this is essential not least 
because in the arena of professional services, there are high levels of uncertainty and 
ambiguity concerning the effectiveness of consultancy interventions (Sturdy 1997; 
also Clark and Fincham  2002). Reputation works for both clients and consultants. For 
clients it gives them some security in their decisions and the effectiveness of those 
                                                 
8 Rose and Hinings provide an interesting discussion of the international level of governance in their 
analysis of GBAFs. 
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decisions even where this is difficult to measure. For consultants, it imbues them with 
a sense of being members of an elite with access to privileged and specialist 
knowledge and confidence in its application. Managing reputation on a global scale 
works for national partnerships as well, enabling them relative autonomy so long as 
they stick to the essential elements that make up the reputation, i.e. the recruitment 
procedures, the up or out promotion system, the maintenance of prestigious client lists 
etc.  
 
On the other hand, if the outcome of this is that the nature of what is delivered is not 
distinctively ‘transnational’, it opens up the question of whether other forms of 
management consultancy organization might not still be able to grow and prosper in 
particular areas of the market. Kipping et al’s recent paper reinforces this point in that 
they note that ‘the consultancy fields in most European countries continue to be 
dominated by individual or very small service providers of domestic origins.’ 
(Kipping et al. 2003: 37; see Rudolph and Okech 2004 for the German case). The 
nature of national management consultancy markets is clearly different and continues 
to affect both the sort of consultancy services required and more particularly the 
nature of the clients, the firms and public organizations requiring those services (see 
the interesting collection of papers in Kipping and Engwall 2002 which look at 
different national contexts). Lowendahl, for example, distinguishes between global 
clients, local clients with ‘global problems’ and local clients with local ‘problems’ 
(Lowendahl 2000:153-157). Whilst one would obviously expect a dominance of 
global management consultancies with global clients and the dominance of local 
consultancies over local clients, there is an area in the middle where there may be a 
great deal of competition. Partly this is an issue of size in that global firms are also 
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typically large firms and can reduce the risk to clients by having a relatively flexible 
resource base in terms of the number and skills of available consultants, but there are 
also cost implications. Global management consultancy firms incur large costs in their 
recruitment and career management. They are unlikely to be able to compete on cost 
terms with more local or national firms so clients will have to balance out these cost 
considerations with reputational and competence considerations before deciding how 
to allocate business. Partly this is also an issue of the relationship to clients and how 
well being part of a global management consultancy may facilitate that. For example, 
one of the ways in which ‘national’ firms emerge is through consultants moving out 
of the global business to set up their own firm. Their international experience is 
clearly beneficial in this but their independence from the global firm and their 
potential network derived both from the global firm and their broader social, political 
and educational contacts may be relevant to them winning clients against the global 
firm. This independence often enabled them to adapt the dominant American message 
and the American techniques of the global firm even more closely to the local 
circumstances. Local high status employees could use their own high status and that 
of the firm which they had just left to make their way into local networks. There is 
evidence that one issue for these types of firms is that they begin to imitate too 
strongly their US origins leading them into expansion plans which eventually end up 
with them seeking out a merger with one of the global firms or being sought out on 
the basis of (re-)capturing their client base. Such high profile national firms have 
therefore tended to decline in significance over the last decade particularly as they 
have found that their home based MNC clients are more interested in international 
advice provided by high status international management consultancies with greater 
resources. Therefore the space for this sort of firm has been severely squeezed.  
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On the other hand there is clearly the continued existence of a sub-strata of local firms 
with smaller scale but higher specialization that can seek to service national clients. It 
is this grouping which is least researched. There is a tendency to assume that this 
grouping basically serves small and medium sized firms rather than multinationals 
and therefore is not really of interest to debates on internationalisation. However, in 
our view, this case is not proven. There are some indications in management 
consultancy (as there are in law) that highly specialist, small-scale ‘boutique’ 
operations can gain business in large multinationals in particular areas. Such 
consultancies can legitimate the claim to customisation and ‘unique solutions’ in a 
way which the global firms cannot so easily do. While they lack the flexibility derived 
from scale advantages, they can keep overheads relatively low and ensure that their 
seniors work more directly with the clients throughout the process. What is less clear 
is whether such firms can at least in part leverage their own international capabilities 
by entering into networks. Historically, a lot of cross-border trade9 in professional 
services has been conducted through networks of referrals and limited movements of 
high reputation individuals. In this model, clients of professional services firm A in 
country Z requires advice about its activities in country Y. Firm A is in a network 
with other independent firms including firm B in country Y. The client’s problem is 
referred to firm B by firm A. In many networks, there will be no fee for the referral as 
the network works on the basis of long-term reciprocity so that firm A will expect in 
the future to receive a referral from firm B.  Firm B bills the client directly. Such 
networks can take many forms in terms of formality, virtuality, permanence, 
mechanisms of control and governance. However, they are unlikely to appear in FDI 
                                                 
9 Such referral networks are also relevant within societies, particularly where regulations have 
constrained a firm from establishing multiple offices across different localities (as has been the case for 
law firms in many countries) but also in conditions of geographical distance. 
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statistics (because there is no flow of capital, just information) even though they may 
well be the most common way in which small and medium sized firms are able to 
seek advice on international issues. The idea of referral networks in management 
consultancy is relatively unexplored. Clearly the management of such networks would 
need to be very careful as alliances with the ‘wrong sort’ of partners could destroy 
credibility. On the other hand in the right circumstances it might be a possible 
alternative to the global firm though there is little research on this issue yet which can 
provide detailed information on which to make a judgement. The network may 
provide a way for smaller more specialist firms to serve international clients as well as 
smaller firms with international requirements. Another aspect of this relates to the 
‘virtual firm’. There are a number of examples of nationally based consultancy 
operations which are, in effect, ‘virtual firms’. By this we mean that the firm itself is 
simply an administrative centre; it does not have its own compliment of consultants 
but rather has a list of other firms (often very small operations down to one person 
businesses) on whom it can call when an enquiry is made. In effect it acts as a dating 
agency bringing together the client and the consultant. However, the client may be 
unaware that this is what happens and may believe that the consultant is an employee 
of the firm with which the initial contact was made. The ‘virtual firm’ model may 
appear highly precarious as it is unclear how standards of service are monitored and 
protected although the professional consulting associations are more evident at the 
level of small and medium sized firms. On the other hand it reduces overhead costs 
significantly and has the potential for reaching beyond the national context. 
 
In conclusion, our argument is that the internationalisation of management 
consultancy firms should not be studied solely form the perspective of the global 
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firms. If we look in more detail at these firms we can see that the benefits which they 
get form internationalisation are primarily derived from reputation. Underneath this 
the global firms remain federations of national partnerships with limited integration or 
knowledge sharing. In particular national markets, national firms are likely to be able 
to link more carefully to the distinctive characteristics of those contexts, most 
obviously in terms of their relations with small and medium sized enterprises but also 
in other ways through their ability to adapt broader messages and techniques to local 
contexts. Furthermore, national firms are not necessarily confined within national 
markets. The possibility of network connections or of the creation of virtual firms 
linking independent consultants to a common marketing arm also exists. It will be an 
interesting project for future research to examine more carefully the extent and 
significance of such alternative international forms. 
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